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Recently the reentry of a number of vehicles has garnered public attention due to the risk of human casualty from 
fragments surviving reentry.  A number of NASA programs have actively sought to minimize the number of 
components likely to survive reentry at the end of their spacecraft’s life in order to meet and/or exceed NASA 
safety standards for controlled and uncontrolled reentering vehicles.  This philosophy, referred to as “Design for 
Demise” or D4D, has steadily been adopted, to at least some degree, by numerous programs.  The result is that 
many programs are requesting evaluations of components at the early stages of vehicle design, as they strive to find 
ways to reduce the number of surviving components while ensuring that they meet the performance requirements of 
their mission. 
 
This paper will discuss some of the methods that have been employed to ensure that the consequences of the 
vehicle’s end-of-life are considered at the beginning of the design process.  In addition this paper will discuss the 
technical challenges overcome, as well as some of the more creative solutions which have been utilized to reduce 
casualty risk.   
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
While the 2011 reentries of UARS and ROSAT 
were high profile, it is important to realize that, on 
average, for the last 50 years some man-made object 
has reentered the atmosphere every day.  When this 
fact is combined with the continually growing 
population of the Earth, the result is an increasing 
risk of a person being killed by reentering debris.  
Since for many vehicles, a controlled reentry over 
unpopulated regions of the globe is not an option, the 
reduction of surviving debris should be addressed 
during the design phase of a project.   
The goal of reducing the amount of hazardous 
debris reaching the surface of the Earth led to a joint 
venture by personnel at the NASA Goddard Space 
Flight Center (GSFC) and the NASA Johnson Space 
Center (JSC) known as Design for Demise (D4D).  
The D4D philosophy encourages that early in the 
design and development phase of a new space 
mission, preferably no later than Phase A, the 
spacecraft bus, payloads, and structural components 
are evaluated for the potential to survive an 
uncontrolled reentry.  This drives an iterative process 
between the reentry survival specialists, who identify 
components likely to reach the Earth’s surface, and 
satellite designers, who seek to minimize the number 
and mass of such objects in a cost-effective manner.  
The process begins with objects that contribute most 
to the human casualty risk, and continues until the 
risk is either eliminated, or reduced to an acceptable 
level. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Since 1995 NASA has held a maximum human 
casualty risk of 1:10,000 for the reentry of any 
satellite, launch vehicle, or any related hardware.  
This limit has since been adopted by all U.S. 
government agencies and many other national space 
agencies, as well as the multinational European 
Space Agency.  In order to assess compliance with 
this requirement, analysts at JSC employ the use of 
the Object Reentry Survival Tool (ORSAT), a 
specially designed computer model developed at 
JSC. 
II.I  Reentry Risk Requirements 
NASA Standard 8719.14A establishes the 
requirement and defines how to calculate human 
casualty risk.  Simply stated the first step in 
determining the risk is to calculate the expected 
debris casualty area (DCA), as in Equation 1.  
[1] 
 
 
where N is the number of objects that survive reentry 
and Ai is the area of the surviving piece in m2.  The 
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from above.  Debris with impacting kinetic energies 
(KE) less than 15 Joules are no longer considered.  
The total expected human casualty, E, can then be 
defined as in Equation 2,  
 
E = DA  x  PD ,   [2] 
 
where PD is equal to the average population density 
for the particular orbital inclination and year of 
reentry. 
II.II  The ORSAT Code 
The ORSAT code was developed at JSC to 
perform assessments of spacecraft, launch vehicle 
stages, and other man-made component survivability 
during atmospheric entry from orbital, sub-orbital, 
and deep space trajectories.  To perform an analysis 
it is necessary to have vehicle trajectory information, 
as well as detailed construction information 
including the location, shape, dimensions, mass, and 
materials of all components.  Once the model is 
complete, ORSAT outputs the demise altitude, for 
objects that do not impact the ground, or the location, 
surviving mass, and KE of impact, for those that do 
(1).   
Survivability of an object is determined by the 
amount of heat absorbed into the component.  The 
rate of heat transfer into an object during reentry is 
strongly influenced by the object’s size and its 
velocity.  The velocity is dependent upon its ballistic 
coefficient, i.e., mass and shape.   
III. CHANGING COMPONENT DESIGNS 
Once an object is identified as contributing to 
human casualty risk, a decision must be made on 
how to change the design to reduce risk.  There are 
four main ways to accomplish this goal: reduce the 
amount of energy required for the object to demise; 
increase the heating rate; layering; or containment.  
By combining these methods, vehicle designers are 
able to control cost while either reducing the number 
of objects striking the earth, or reducing the KE to an 
acceptable level at impact.   
III.I  Reduce Energy Required for Total Demise 
For a component to demise, it must absorb enough 
energy to raise its temperature from an initial 
temperature to its melting temperature and then 
absorb enough additional energy to melt the object.  
The amount of energy required to increase the 
temperature is determined by the specific heat, Cp.  
The heat of fusion, hf, determines the amount of 
energy required for the material to melt.  Both Cp 
and hf are unique to each material and are defined per 
units mass, meaning that if the mass of a material 
increases, the total energy required to melt an object 
increases.  In order to reduce the energy required for 
a component to demise, some combination of 
material change and mass reduction must be utilized. 
III.I.I  Change of Material 
Materials such as titanium and stainless steel 
have long been used for the construction of satellites 
and launch vehicles, due to a variety of physical 
attributes, particularly inherent strength.  
Unfortunately many of these materials also have high 
melting temperatures resulting in the components 
comprised of them having a high likelihood of 
surviving reentry. 
 
Figure 1 shows a comparison of the demise 
factor versus time for two spheres with the same 
dimensions and initial mass, so that the ballistic 
coefficient is the same, but one is aluminum (melting 
temperature 880 K), while the other is titanium 
(melting temperature 1670 K).  The demise factor is 
defined as the total amount of energy absorbed 
divided by the total amount of energy required to 
raise the temperature from 300 K to the object’s 
melting point, plus the heat of fusion for the entire 
mass.  As can be seen, the aluminum sphere demises 
early in the reentry process, while the titanium sphere 
survives to the ground. 
 
 
Figure 1: The demise factor versus time for two 
aerodynamically similar spheres composed of 
different materials 
 
For the Global Precipitation Measurement 
(GPM) Spacecraft, the debris casualty area (DCA) 
was a budgeted quantity much like mass or power.  
As part of the D4D initiative, a number of 
components were evaluated early in the spacecraft 
design process, including the propellant tank and the 
reaction wheel, which together contributed to a large 
proportion of the human casualty risk for the entire 
spacecraft.  To address this risk the spacecraft 
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designers opted for a change of material for these 
objects.   
The DCA budget assigned to the GPM reaction 
wheels was zero, meaning there could be no 
surviving components that reached the ground with 
an impact energy greater than 15 J.  A study to 
compare the survivability of commercially available 
reaction wheels was undertaken, with the result that 
none of the examined reaction wheels met this 
requirement.  In response, GSFC developed and 
qualified a fully demiseable reaction wheel by 
replacing the high temperature melting point 
materials with aluminum (2).   
In a similar manner, the propulsion system was 
assigned a maximum DCA of zero.  Once again the 
satellite designers were unable to locate an 
acceptable tank from already existing commercial 
suppliers, so the decision was made to develop a tank 
as well.  In the case of the fuel tank, the idea of using 
an aluminum tank for hydrazine was novel, resulting 
in a question about chemical compatibility between 
the fuel and the tank.  After a number of experiments 
and studies GSFC was able to design the tank and 
propellant management device using aluminum, 
which will completely demise during reentry (3). 
The NASA Fermi mission, formally known as 
the Gamma Ray Large Area Telescope, used a 
variety of methods to reduce the number of surviving 
components.  Of particular interest to this section 
were the optical bench struts, originally composed of 
titanium.  When a reentry survivability analysis was 
performed on the struts, they contributed ~4m2 to the 
overall debris casualty area of the vehicle.  The 
satellite design team was able to replace them with 
graphite epoxy struts which met the structural 
requirements and completely demised during an 
uncontrolled reentry. (4) 
III.I.II  Mass Removal 
If used in significant quantities even low melting 
point materials can survive reentry.  This is often the 
case for structural support members.  The use of 
strategically-located cut-outs in bulkheads allow 
components to retain structural integrity, while 
increasing the likelihood of demising by a 
combination of less mass and improved heat transfer 
processes.   
Figure 2 shows the demise factor versus time for 
two aluminum boxes with identical dimensions.  The 
first has a mass of 16.8 kg, while the second has a 
mass of 33.6 kg.  This scenario illustrates that by 
finding creative methods to reduce the mass of an 
object, the likelihood of demise can be increased.  It 
also has the added benefit of reducing the overall 
mass for the affected system, allowing the overall 
mass of the vehicle to be reduced. 
To reduce mass, an increasing number of 
spacecraft and launch vehicles have begun to utilize 
composite overwraps.  Adding multiple layers of 
composite materials increases strength, which 
permits the designers to reduce the wall thickness of 
the metallic tank shell.  The GPM tank mentioned 
previously was, in fact, a composite overwrapped 
pressure vessel with an aluminum liner.   
 
 
Figure 2: Demise factor versus time for two 
identically sized aluminum boxes with different 
masses of aluminum used. 
III.II  Altering the Ballistic Coefficient  
The heat rate that an object will experience 
during reentry is driven primarily by an object’s size 
and its velocity.  In turn, the velocity is determined 
by the object’s ballistic coefficient, i.e., mass and 
shape.  Altering the ballistic coefficient of a 
component can result in the survivability of that 
component changing as well.   
III.II.I  Shape Considerations 
Sometimes the shape of a component can affect 
how it will demise during reentry.  In one NASA 
program the spacecraft included titanium flexures to 
support the primary instrument.  These titanium 
flexures were found to survive re-entry with an 
impact energy greater than 15 J. Different materials 
were considered to replace the titanium, but none 
were acceptable.  Instead, the shape of the flexures 
was altered, changing the ballistic coefficient enough 
to eliminate the re-entry hazard. 
Figure 3 compares for the demise factor versus 
time for a sphere, cylinder, and box, all similarly 
sized and with the same mass, comprised of stainless 
steel.  Since the masses are equal, but each shape has 
unique drag characteristics, the comparison 
illustrates the impact of geometry on survivability.  
In this case, both the sphere and cylinder demise 
relatively quickly, while the box survives. 
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